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PRINCIPLES AND POWER IN




A S A POLITICAL SCIENTIST who has devoted considerable
attention to the Canadian health care system, I have two
purposes in this article. One is to describe the evolution of the
Canadian health care system in comparison with that of some
other systems, notably those of Britain and the U.S., and in
brief comparison with another component of the Canadian wel-
fare state - the public pension system. The other is to explain
this evolution by making a central argument. Welfare states
institutionalize principles of distributive justice. In so doing,
they translate those principles into structures of power. It is
through those power structures that principles of distributive
justice will be expressed and will have their impact. The central
feature of the power structure of the Canadian health care sys-
tem is an accommodation between the providers of health care,
most particularly the medical profession, and the state. In this
accommodation, the medical profession has traded off a sub-
stantial part of the entrepreneurial, economic discretion of phy-
sicians in order to preserve their clinical autonomy. This ac-
commodation itself is evolving over time, but it will continue to
be central to the development of the system in the future.




If you seek to understand the prevailing principles of dis-
tributive justice in a given nation, look to the structure of its
welfare state. In terms of the principles of distributive justice
which underlie them, one can identify four types of welfare
states in advanced capitalist nations: social democratic, corpo-
ratist, residualist and what, for want of a more descriptive
term, might be called the "Beveridge" model.1
Social democratic welfare states have universal and gener-
ous programs whose benefits are available on uniform terms
and conditions to all citizens.2 Entitlement to benefits is on the
basis of membership in the national community - in this sense
there is a citizen's "right" to benefits - and programs are
designed to be attractive to all members of the community, not
just those who have no private alternatives.' Indeed, the as-
sumption is that there will be little recourse to private markets
for social or health services or for insurance against income dis-
ruption or decline.4
Corporatist welfare states offer differentiated benefits
through social insurance for defined groups (primarily occupa-
tionally defined) within the population. These programs tend to
be generous overall, but the level of generosity varies within "a
labyrinth of status-specific insurance funds." 5 Entitlement is
based on contribution, and levels of both contribution and ben-
efits are determined by occupational status.6
The residualist welfare state is market-oriented. The un-
derlying assumption is that the market is the primary mecha-
nism of allocation and distribution.7 Health and social services
as well as income ought to accrue to individuals not on the ba-
sis of a social entitlement, but primarily according to the indi-
vidual's "marginal rate of productivity." Welfare state pro-
1. See GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 26-
27 (1990) (describing what I have termed as the "corporatist" and "residualist" types of
welfare states as "conservative" and "liberal" respectively). Epsing-Anderson does not
identify a separate "Beveridge" type.
2. Id. at 27.
3. See id.
4. See id. at 28.
5. See id. at 24.
6. Id. at 22.
7. Id. at 26-27.
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grams are directed primarily to those most disadvantaged in
the market-hence, the term "residualist." Means-tested pro-
grams predominate, benefits are relatively low so as not to
draw labor out of the market, universalism is limited and the
middle and upper-classes turn to the market, not the state, for
health and social services and income protection.8
Finally, the Beveridge model combines elements of each of
the other three types. From the corporatist model comes the
social insurance principle that benefits are to be based on con-
tributions.' But contributions and benefit schedules are not sta-
tus-specific; rather, they are based on the social-democratic
principle of universality.10 Finally, like the programs of the
residualist welfare state, Beveridge-type programs are limited
in their generosity. The underlying principles assume that all
individuals have a citizenship right to participate in a social
insurance plan providing a minimum level of benefits, but that
any individual ought to be able to substantially improve his or
her position through participation in the market. 1
These four models represent pure types. In the real world,
each of these models has been subject to strain and evolution
over time. The social democratic model has been most closely
approximated by Sweden, although the level of generosity of
the Swedish welfare state has become increasingly contested in
the late 1980s and 1990s. Germany most closely corresponds to
the corporatist model, and the U.S. to the residualist model."2
And of course, the empirical expression of the Beveridge model
is identified in his name, referring to the vision of the Beveridge
Report of 1942 on which the post-war reform of the British
welfare state was based.' 3 But the growth over time in the rela-
tive importance of means-tested "supplementary benefits" has
given the British welfare state an increasingly residualist cast.
Some systems, moreover, combined elements of at least
three of these models. Japan, for example, arguably combined
corporatist, residualist and Beveridge models in the design of
8. Id. at 22.
9. See id. at 22.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 23.
12. Id. at 27.
13. WILLIAM BEVERIDGE. U.K. INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON SOCIAL INS AND
ALLIED SERVS. SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES. REPORT BY SIR WILLIAM BEV-
ERIDGE (HMSO 1942).
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its health insurance and pension systems.1' And Canada
presents the joint phenomena of a social democratic health in-
surance system, a quasi-Beveridge-style pension system and a
residualist system of income maintenance.
I want to focus in this article on the Canadian case, first to
consider the distinctive character of the Canadian health insur-
ance system, then to view the health insurance system in com-
parison with some other national systems and with the Cana-
dian public pension system. The Canadian case suggests that
quite different models of distributive justice can coexist in dif-
ferent components of a given welfare state, even when those
components came into being at the same time and within the
same institutional structures. I will argue that the answer to
this apparent anomaly lies in the evolution of the welfare state
over time, an evolution shaped only indirectly by the principles
of distributive justice that the system embodies. Any set of
principles of distributive justice, once institutionalized in a set
of programs and structures, implies a structure of power. And
it is that power structure, at least as much as the principles and
ideas embedded in the system, that will determine the system's
evolution.
In the case of health insurance systems, a central compo-
nent of the power structure is the role of the medical profes-
sion. In the Canadian case, I will argue, much of the "success"
of the system - its universality, its comprehensive coverage
and its record of relatively moderate rates of increase in costs
over time - is attributable to the particular nature of the ac-
commodation between the medical profession and the state.
PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CANADIAN
HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM
State-sponsored health insurance was first introduced in
Canada at the provincial level, as various provincial govern-
ments introduced different models of hospital and medical in-
surance in the 1940s through the 1960s.15 The contemporary
14. See Samuel H. Preston & Shigemi Kono, Trends in Well-Being of Children and
the Elderly in Japan in THE VULNERABLE 277, 285-86 (John L. Palmer et al. eds., 1988)
(describing the Japanese health insurance system).
15. See generally Malcom G. Taylor, The Canadian Health Insurance Program,
PUB. ADMIN. REv., Jan./Feb. 1973, at 31 [hereinafter Canadian Health]; MALCOM G
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universal Canadian health insurance system, however, had its
genesis in the province of Saskatchewan, under the social dem-
ocratic New Democratic Party ("NDP"). 0 The NDP intro-
duced universal comprehensive hospital insurance in 1944,17
and universal comprehensive medical care insurance in 1962.18
Each of these models was in due course replicated at the fed-
eral level, with the passage of the Federal Hospital Insurance
and Diagnostic Services Act in 195819 and the federal Medical
Care Act in 1966.20 By 1971, all provinces had universal medi-
cal and hospital services insurance plans eligible for federal
cost-sharing. 21 To be eligible, provincial programs had to meet
five essentially social democratic general criteria: universal cov-
erage (at least ninety-five percent of the population), compre-
hensive coverage of medical and hospital services, provision of
coverage on uniform terms and conditions, portability across
provinces and public administration.2 2 These criteria were con-
sistent with the "Health Charter for Canadians" 23 that had
been set out by a federal Royal Commission on Health Services
that had reported in 1964, recommending a universal compre-
hensive state-sponsored system of health insurance.24 Notably,
the Health Charter also included commitments of "freedom of
choice" for patients in the selection of physicians and vice
versa, and to "free and self-governing professions."25 While
these latter two principles in the Health Charter were not spe-
cifically enshrined in legislation, they were clearly embedded in
the system that resulted.
Indeed, the advent of national health insurance in Canada
essentially froze in place the delivery system that existed in the
1960s, by underwriting its costs. One has only to compare Ca-
nadian developments with those in Britain on the one hand and
in the U.S. on the other to appreciate this point. In Britain,
TAYLOR, INSURING NATIONAL HEALTH CARE: THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE (1990) [here-
inafter INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE].
16. See INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE, supra note 15, at 7.
17. Id. at 7, 67-68.
18. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 34 n.13.
19. R.S.C., ch. H-8 (1956-57) (Can.).
20. R.S.C., ch. M-8 (1970) (Can.).
21. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 31.
22. Id. at 36.
23. Contained in 1 CAN. ROYAL COMM'N ON HEALTH SERVS. REPORT (1964).
24. See INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE, supra note 15, at 134-39.
25. Id. at 135 (quoting the Health Charter).
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massive organizational change was inherent in the establish-
ment of the National Health Services in 1948. In the U.S., or-
ganizational change flowed from the very absence of national
health insurance in the 1970s and 1980s.28 In Canada, organi-
zational change was forestalled by the introduction of a system
of financing which essentially underwrote the costs of the ex-
isting delivery system without changing its structure.
The health care delivery systems of Canada and the U.S.
were very similar in the 1960s; medical services provided by
physicians in private fee-for-service practices; hospital services
provided in non-profit institutions owned by voluntary societies,
religious orders, municipalities and universities; extended care
facilities owned by such non-profit groups or by private inde-
pendent for-profit operators. In the 1990s, the delivery system
in the U.S. appears transformed. In the absence of national
health insurance, public policy has elaborated both categorical
programs and regulatory constraints. The resulting complexity
has given a competitive advantage to providers with the re-
sources to invest in understanding the system and responding
strategically. Public policy has thus fostered organizational
change not only directly (as in the case of health maintenance
organizations, preferred provider organizations, etc.) but also
indirectly (as in the case of large multi-institutional changes,
many of them for-profit, which have sprung up in response to
the increasing complexity of the system). 7
In Canada, organization change has been much more
modest. The proportion of large group practices has increased,
and there have been a number of hospital mergers; but Canada
has seen nothing like the "coming of the corporation" to the
health care arena on the scale that has occurred in the U.S. 28
Organizational change is, however, on the agenda of the 1990s
- a point to which I shall return below.
The proportion of total health care spending in Canada
that flows through the public treasury, at just under three-
quarters, is close to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development ("OECD") average.29 Canada differs from
26. See Paul Starr, The Social Transformatin of American Medicine 419 (1982).
27. Id. at 428.
28. Id. at 419, 420, 428.
29. CAROLYN TUOHY, SOCIAL POLICY: Two WORLDS, IN GOVERNING CANADA IN-
STITUTIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 275, 285 (Michael M. Atkinson ed., 1993).
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most OECD nations, however, in the pattern of public and pri-
vate expenditure. In most other nations public and private ex-
penditures are divided on a "tiered" basis-with private alter-
natives to publicly funded services within each category of
service. In Canada, however, public and private expenditures
are segmented. Certain segments - notably medical and hos-
pital services - are almost entirely publicly funded; others,
such as dental care, drugs and eyeglasses as well as other pros-
theses, are in the private sector.30
Canada, then, interpreted the social-democratic principle
of universality as implying the removal of financial barriers to
access an established health care system. Accordingly, it pro-
vides universal first-dollar coverage for a comprehensive range
of medical and hospital services, within delivery structures that
preserve the patient's choice of physician and vice versa. And it
has done so at relatively "generous" levels. Government spend-
ing on health care, which ranged between five and seven per-
cent of GDP in the 1980s, is comparable to Western European
levels, and well above that in both Britain and the U.S.31
THE EFFECTS OF CANADIAN MEDICARE
The medical and hospital system which Canadian govern-
ments undertook to finance in the 1960s was an expensive one,
in international perspective, due in large part to the intensive
use of hospital services. And it is still relatively expensive: per
capita costs are second (albeit a fairly distant second) to those
in the U.S.32 However, the rate of cost escalation has been rela-
tively moderate. Canadian health care expenditures (both pub-
lic and private) increased 70% faster than Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP") from 1960 to 1985, as compared with 120%
30. US. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN. COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. CANNADIAN HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES. Doc. No. GAO/HRD-91-90, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 23 (1991) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Various provinces have plans covering drugs
or dental care for certain categories within the population, such as children's dental care or
drugs for those over sixty-five. Id. In the hospital sector, various amenities such as private
rooms, can be purchased on an individual basis.
31. NEW ORIENTATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY, OECD Social Policy Studies No. 12,
at tbl. 2 (1994); see also Michael O'Higgins, The Allocation of Public Resources to Chil-
dren and the Elderly in OECD Countries, in THE VULNERABLE 29, 214-15 tbl. 9.6 (1988).
32. CAROLYN J. TUOHY. POLICY AND POLITICS IN CANADA: INSTITUTIONALIZED AM-
BIVALENCE 105 (1992).
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in Britain, 130% in the U.S., 200% in Sweden and an OECD
average of 90 % .3
The removal of financial barriers to care, moreover, ap-
pears to have had its intended effects. There have been a num-
ber of studies of the impact of Medicare on the utilization of
medical and hospital services across income classes. Despite
some methodological difficulties, and some modest variation in
the findings, a recent comprehensive review of these studies
could fairly conclude that "a notable policy achievement [has]
been realized resulting in the progressive redistribution by class
in the use of health care." 4
As the issue of national health insurance has waxed and
waned on the policy agenda of the U.S., the "Canadian model"
has periodically been raised in that context by both enthusiasts
and skeptics. Many of the perceptions of the Canadian system
are based on anecdotes or misinformation. One benefit of the
increased American interest in the Canadian system, however,
at least from an academic perspective, has been an increase in
the number of comparative studies of the two systems.
a) Cost Control and Access
There is little debate that the Canadian system provides
access to a wide range of medical and hospital services to a far
larger proportion of its population while remaining less costly
than the American system.3" The Canadian system provides
first-dollar coverage of medical and hospital services for all res-
idents; and while the range of services covered varies somewhat
from province to province, the range of services covered is ex-
tensive.3 6 In the U.S., about fifteen percent of the population
has no health insurance coverage;37 and for the remainder the
extent and terms of coverage vary widely between public and
private plans and among private plans.38 In Canada, charges to
patients in excess of the government benefit for insured services
33. Id. (citing Schieber & Poullier 1987).
34. Robin F. Badgley, Social and Economic Disparities Under Canadian Health
Care, 21 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVS. 659, 662 (1991).
35. See GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 20-24, 28-29 (1991).
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 23-24.
38. Id. at 24.
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are banned, and there are no deductibles or co-payments. 39 In
the U.S., "co-payments and deductibles are common, and it is
not unusual for health care providers to bill the patient for
charges in excess of the standard insurance reimbursement."40
As for cost, total per capita health care expenditures in
Canada (including public and private expenditures) are about
two-thirds of those in the U.S.41 As a proportion of the GDP,
total health care expenditures rose from 8.5% to 10.0% be-
tween 1985 and 1991 in Canada, for a compound annual in-
crease of 2.7 %.42 In the U.S. in the same period, total health
expenditures rose from 10.5 to 13.2% of GDP, for a compound
annual increase of 3.9%." (It should be noted here that the
U.S. and Canada have the two most expensive health care sys-
tems in the OECD.44 The fact that Canada is a distant second
to the U.S.45 is of great interest in the context of North Ameri-
can debates over health care policy; but it should not obscure
the expensiveness of the Canadian system.)
Canada achieves its lower costs in a number of ways. In
the first place, the administrative costs of the "single payer"
Canadian system are considerably lower than those of the
U.S.46 For Canadian public insurers, "there are no marketing
expenses, no costs of estimating risk status in order to set dif-
ferential premiums or decide whom to cover, and no allocation
for shareholder profits; the process of claims payment, although
not free of costs, is greatly simplified and much cheaper. 47 For
Canadian providers, the single-payer system means less admin-
istrative overhead. In 1987, for example, office expenses for
physicians in Canada amounted on average to about thirty-six
percent of their gross billings, as compared with forty-eight
percent in the U.S.48 The General Accounting Office of the U.S
Congress ("GAO") has estimated that difference in insurers'
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 4.
41. George J. Schieber et al., DataWatch: Health Spending, Delivery and Outcomes
in OECD Countries, 12 HEALTH AFFAIRS 120, 121 (1993) (utilizing 1991 statistics).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 121-22.
45. Id.
46. Robert G. Evans et al., Controlling Health Expenditures: The Canadian Real-
ity,, 320 NEw ENG J MED. 571, 573 (1989).
47. Id. at 572-73.
48. GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 5.
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overhead accounts for about seventeen percent of the difference
in cost between the two systems.49 Others have estimated that
if provider overhead related to the costs of the multi-payer sys-
tem in the U.S. are included, differences in administrative costs
may account for more than half of the difference between the
two systems. °
b) Payments to Providers
Canada's lower expenditures on health care also reflect
lower levels of payment to health care providers. In 1987, Ca-
nada spent thirty-four percent less per capita on physician ser-
vices and eighteen percent less per capita on hospital services
than did the U.S., despite the fact that Canada had roughly the
same number of physicians and about forty percent more hospi-
tal beds per capita.5 1 Differences in spending on physicians re-
flects two factors: a different specialty mix (the U.S. has a
higher specialist: general practitioner ratio) and the level of
physician fees.5 In the decade following the introduction of
Canadian Medicare, real physician fees rose much faster in the
U.S. than in Canada; indeed in Canada (with the exception of
British Columbia and Alberta), real fees declined over that pe-
riod.53 Between 1971 and 1985, real fees declined eighteen per-
cent in Canada and rose twenty-two percent in the U.S.5" Dif-
ferences in net income are less than might be expected,
however, partly due to lower practice expenses. Because of the
different specialty mixes in the two countries, income compari-
sons are best made by specialty. One such comparison, related
U.S. physicians to their counterparts in Ontario.5 5 In 1986, av-
erage net incomes in general practice and family practice were
marginally higher for the U.S. than for Ontario physicians. 56
49. Id. at 29.
50. Evans et al., supra note 46, at 572-73.
51. Morris L. Barer & Robert G. Evans, Riding North on a South-bound Horse?:
Expenditures, Prices, Utilization and Incomes in the Canadian Health Care System, in
MEDICARE AT MATURITY 53, 78-80 (Robert G. Evans & Greg L. Stoddart eds., 1986).
52. See GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 35-38.
53. See id. at 35.
54. Id.
55. John K. Iglehart, Canada's Health Care System Faces Its Problems, 322 NEw
ENG. J. MED 562 (1990). Ontario physicians represent about 40% of all Canadian physi-
cians; and both net professional incomes and medical fees are close to the Canadian aver-
age. See Barer & Evans, supra note 51, at 78, 94; Inglehart, supra, at 563, 568.
56. See Inglehart, supra note 55, at 568.
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The differences were more pronounced in obstetrics and gyne-
cology, with U.S. physicians earning on average one-quarter to
one-third more than their Ontario counterparts.51 In pediatrics
and internal medicine, however, the net earnings of Ontario
physicians were on average marginally higher than those in the
U.S.58 In this respect, as in a number of others shortly to be
discussed, the most pronounced differences between the two
systems are related to areas of intensive care.
c) Hospital Utilization
Differences in hospital expenditures reflect in part differ-
ent mixes of hospital activities: the U.S. favors intensive, high-
technology services while Canada leans toward long-term
chronic care.59 (Hence, hospital costs can be lower in Canada
than in the U.S. even while hospitalization rates are higher.)
But even after allowing for such differences, a study of hospital
costs in California, New York, British Columbia and Ontario
found that "the cost of an average intensive care day in Cali-
fornia in 1985 was more than twice that of a corresponding day
in a Canadian hospital. . . . Canadian hospitals appear to com-
bine lower treatment intensity with longer inpatient stays."60
Even with longer stays, Canadian costs per discharge were
about thirty percent lower than those in New York hospitals
and thirty-eight percent lower than those in California in
1985.61 It is worth noting, however, that Canadian and Ameri-
can hospitals were much more similar with regard to the costs
of outpatient visits.6 2
d) High Technology and Queues
These cost advantages of the Canadian system have led
American skeptics to look for the potential downside: in partic-
ular, restrictions on the availability of high-technology service,
and waiting times or "queues" for service. It is with regard to
such allegations that the relevant data tend to become more
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Evans et al., supra note 46, at 574.
60. Jack Zwanziger et al., DataWatch: Comparision of Hospital Costs in California,
New York, and Canada, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1993, at 130, 137.
61. Id. at 135.
62. Id. at 134.
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anecdotal and less systematic; but some work has been done to
provide a basis for comparison.
There is little doubt that the U.S. exceeds Canada in the
availability of high-technology procedures. This is consistent
with the general phenomenon that the diffusion of technology
has been greater in systems with high proportions of specialists
and less centralized cost control.63 As a matter of public policy,
Canadian provincial governments control the diffusion of medi-
cal technology. Operating funds for certain types of equipment
such as imaging machines will not be provided unless acquisi-
tion of the equipment has been approved by the government.64
Furthermore, under the hospital global budgeting system, any
significant change in the volume of service, including high-tech-
nology services, must be approved in order for the hospital to
receive the necessary additional operating funds.6 5
Neither nation systematically collects data relating to the
availability of high-technology services; but a study by a senior
policy analyst for the American Medical Association, based on
interviews and the review of relevant documents and literature,
compared the availability of selected technologies in Canada,
the U.S. and Germany.66 He found "(1) nearly eight times
more MRI [magnetic resonance imaging] and radiation ther-
apy units per capita in the United States than in Canada; (2)
over six times more lithotripsy centers per capita in the United
States; (3) roughly three times more cardiac catheterization
and open-heart surgery units per capita in the United States;
and (4) slightly more availability of organ transplantation units
per capita in the United States."67 German ratios were inter-
mediate between Canada and the U.S. in the case of cardiac
catheterization, radiation therapy, lithotripsy and MRI, and
were below Canadian ratios for open-heart surgery and organ
transplantation."
63. See J. ROGERS HOLLINGSWORTH ET AL.. STATE INTERVENTION IN MEDICAL
CARE: CONSEQUENCES FOR BRITAIN. FRANCE, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED STATES. 1870-
1970 (1990).
64. GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 48.
65. Id. at 48-49.
66. Dale A. Rublee, DataWatch: Medical Technology In Canada, Germany, And
The United States, 8 Health Affairs 178 (1989).
67. Id. at 178.
68. See id. at 180 Exhibit I.
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Other comparative work has focused on one of these tech-
nologies - open-heart surgery, and in particular, coronary ar-
tery bypass surgery ("CABS"). A survey of California, New
York, British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario hospital dis-
charge data found that in 1989 the age-adjusted CABS rate in
California was twenty-seven percent higher than in New York
and eighty percent higher than in the three Canadian provinces
combined.6 9 In the two American states, however, CABS rates
were higher in high-income areas; while in Canada, rates va-
ried little by the income of the area of residence. 0 Earlier work
comparing hospital discharge data for Manitoba and Ontario
with Medicare data from the U.S. for 1983 found markedly
higher rates of CABS for elderly patients in the U.S. than in
Canada.7 1 For the sixty-five to seventy-four age group, U.S.
rates were over twice as high as in Canada; and for patients
over seventy-five the U.S. rate was four times the Canadian
rate.7 2 In the case of other surgical procedures for the treat-
ment of ischemic heart disease, however, differences were much
less pronounced. The rate of cardiac-valve procedures for all
patients over sixty-five years of age was only twenty percent
higher in the U.S. than in Canada; and with regard to other
major reconstructive vascular surgery and pacemaker implan-
tation, Canadian rates were higher. 3
The lesser availability of some high-technology services in
Canada has given rise to concern about waiting times or
"queues" for various services. There is a plethora of anecdote,
as well as a dearth of systematic data regarding waiting times
for service on both sides of the Canada-U.S. border. Press cov-
erage of waiting times for certain procedures in Ontario
reached a mild crescendo in the late 1980s. The U.S. GAO, in
the context of a study of the Canadian health care system, con-
ducted a survey of selected specialty units in Ontario's twenty-
six teaching hospitals in October 1990 (by which time some
steps had already been taken to shorten waiting times in a
69. Geoffrey M. Anderson et al., Use of Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery in the
United States and Canada, 269 JAMA 1661, 1661 (1993).
70. Id.
71. Geoffrey M. Anderson et al., Hospital Care for Elderly Patients with Diseases
of the Circulatory System: A Comparision of Hospital Use in the United States and Ca-
nada, 21 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1443, 1447 (1989).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1446-47.
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number of areas, as noted below) to determine the extent of
queuing for services in eight areas of high-technology: CAT
("computerized axial tomography") scan, MRI ("magnetic
resonance imaging"), cardiovascular surgery, eye surgery,
orthopaedic surgery, lithotripsy, specialized physical rehabilita-
tion and autologous bone marrow transplants. 4 The GAO
found virtually no queues for "emergent" cases, except in the
case of lithotripsy, for which, at the time of the GAO study,
there was only one unit in the province."5 It did, however, find
considerable variation in waiting times for urgent and elective
cares. (Another study also found considerable variation in the
classification of CABS cases as "emergent," "urgent" and
"elective. '76 ) The longest queues for elective cases existed for
lithotripsy (twenty-four months) and for MRI (up to sixteen
months)." For cardiovascular surgery, waiting times in urgent
cases ranged from one day to one week, and in elective cases
from one week to six months." It should be kept in mind that
these data were collected from hospital administrators at a
time when the provincial government was responding to queues
in part by providing hospitals with additional funding, and as
the GAO noted, there was no independent source of data from
which it could verify these figures. 7 9 The GAO did not present
comparable data for the U.S.
The existence of such queues brought about responses on
the part of provincial governments. Some of the responses in-
volved the approval of additional equipment and facilities. In
Ontario, a second lithotripsy unit was approved,s0 and open-
heart surgery capacity was expanded, including the opening of
an additional unit."' Bottlenecks in related areas such as inten-
sive care units were also addressed with additional funding.82
In addition, responses focused on the better management of
queues on a regional basis and greater attention to case selec-
74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 55 tbl. 4.1.
75. Id. at 56.
76. C. David Naylor, A Different View of Queues in Ontario, 10 HEALTH AFFAIRS
110, 114 (1991).
77. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 55 tbl. 4.1.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 54.
80. Id. at 56 n.h.
81. Naylor, supra note 76, at 115-16.
82. Id. at 116.
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tion and classification and to the use of alternative tech-
niques. 3 The backlog of CABS patients was also reduced by
referring about sixteen percent of waiting patients for treat-
ment in the U.S.84 This combination of responses led to a dra-
matic decline in waiting times. By January 1991, waiting times
in elective CABS cases had been reduced to a few weeks, down
from three months or more in some facilities a year earlier."s
As noted, some of the backlog of CABS cases was cleared
by referring patients to U.S. facilities. This raises the question
of the extent to which the U.S. functions as a "safety valve"
for the Canadian system. In a recent cross-national survey of
physicians, nearly one-third of the Canadian respondents (as
compared with nineteen percent of respondents in western Ger-
many and seven percent of American respondents) reported re-
ferring a patient outside the country for treatment.86 But the
number of patients involved is relatively small. Informal
surveys of border hospitals by the Pepper Commission in the
U.S. and by the American Medical Association in the late
1980s suggest that Canadians accounted in most cases for less
than one percent, and in no case more than three percent of
admissions.8s Large numbers of Canadians vacation in the
U.S., particularly in the winter months, however; and the high
cost of reimbursing them for medical and hospital care received
in that context has led some provincial governments, notably
Ontario, to limit the rate of reimbursement. 88
The constrained availability of high-technology services is
only a problem, of course, to the extent that such services are
not available for cases for which they are truly indicated, and
in which they will be efficacious. And in this regard, there is
still much research to be done. In commenting on his findings
of the differences in the availability of high-technology services
83. See id.
84. Id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 60-61.
85. Naylor, supra note 76, at 115, 116.
86. Robert J. Blendon et al., Physicians' Perspectives on Caring for Patients in the
United States, Canada, and West Germany, 328 NEw ENG J. MED. 1011, 1014 (1993).
87. GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 60.
88. It should be noted that there is also a flow of patients in the other direction, both
legally and illegally. Hospitals in Ontario have been directed by the Ministry of Health to
ensure that their acceptance of U.S. patients does not restrict the availability of facilities
for Canadian patients. The issues of the fraudulent use of government health care insur-
ance cards by non-residents has also received considerable attention both within the Minis-
try of Health and in the press.
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in Canada, the U.S. and Germany noted above, Dale Rublee
pointed out that "the differences can be interpreted to suggest
overprovision in the United States rather than underprovision
in Canada or Germany."89 And, noting the wide variation
across geographic areas within as well as between the U.S. and
Canada in the utilization of CABS, the GAO cautioned that,
"Canada's lower rates for certain procedures do not conclu-
sively represent underservicing, nor do U.S. rates conclusively
represent over-provision of service." 90
e) Patient and Provider Satisfaction
As most comparative studies of health care systems sug-
gest, different systems entail different trade-offs. The Canadian
system offers much broader accessibility and generally less ser-
vice intensity than is the case in the U.S. These trade-offs have
resulted in a system which, while not without its critics, is over-
whelmingly popular. Medicare has virtually become a defining
element of the Canadian identity. During the heated and
wrenching public debate over the Free Trade Agreement
("FTA") with the United States in 1988, politicians opposing
the agreement repeatedly invoked Medicare as one of the
things that distinguished Canada from the U.S., and alleged
that it was threatened by the agreement. Public opinion polls
showed that this allegation was the most effective way of galva-
nizing opposition to the FTA. 91 Polls have consistently demon-
strated that Medicare is by far the most popular public pro-
gram in Canada.9 And a 1988 cross-national poll showed that
Canadians were more satisfied with their health care system
than were either American or British respondents, and that
they overwhelmingly preferred the Canadian system to the
British or the American systems.9" A large majority of Ameri-
can respondents, on the other hand, preferred a Canadian-style
89. Rublee, supra note 66, at 181.
90. GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 51.
91. Richard Johnston & Andre Blais, A Resounding Maybe, THE GLOBE AND MAIL
(TORONTO), Dec. 19, 1988.
92. Robert J. Blendon, Three Systems: A Comparative Survey, 11 HEALTH MGMT
Q 2-10 (1989).
93. Id. at 5.
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system to their own.94 Subsequent polls have reinforced these
results.95
What is perhaps more surprising is the relatively favorable
light in which the system is viewed by health care providers.
Even in briefs critical of government policy, medical groups,
for example, typically present the Canadian system as one of
the best in the world, while expressing some concerns about its
future. 96 The twin spectors of the U.S. system (intrusive regu-
lation, corporate dominance, inadequate coverage) and the
British system (inadequate resources, excessive rationing) are
frequently evoked. Attitude surveys of physicians find large
majorities are satisfied with their conditions of practice and
positively oriented toward Medicare - although sizable pock-
ets of discontent remain. A 1986 survey of Canadian physi-
cians, for example, found less than one-quarter dissatisfied with
medical practice and less than one-third dissatisfied with the
functioning of Medicare. 97 Sixty percent believed that Medi-
care had positively influenced health status, but seventy-five
percent believed that it had reduced the individual's personal
sense of responsibility for health.98
A more extensive comparative survey in 1991 shed light on
the judgments of physicians in Canada, the U.S. and western
Germany regarding the trade-offs implicit in their health care
systems. In general, although a majority of physicians in each
country believed that some fundamental changes in their health
systems were necessary, satisfaction with the health system was
higher among Canadian and German physicians than among
American physicians. 99 When respondents were asked to iden-
tify the most serious problems with their system, the sharpest
differences arose between Canadian and American physicians,
whose judgments of their respective systems appeared virtually
as mirror images of each other. American physicians were
much more likely than Canadian physicians to identify the fol-
94. Id.
95. E.g., GALLUP CANADA. THE GALLUP REPORT, August 1, 1991 (Toronto 1991).
96. See, e.g., TUOHY, supra note 32, at 144-45.
97. Michael H. Stevenson, Eugene Vayda & A. Paul Williams, MEDICAL POLITICS
AFTER THE CANADA HEALTH ACT: PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE 1986 PHYSICIANS' SUR-
VEY, Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Associa-
tion, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario (1987).
98. Id.
99. Blendon et al., supra note 86, at 1012.
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lowing as serious problems with their system: delays or disputes
in processing insurance forms and in receiving payment, the in-
ability of patients to afford some aspect of necessary medical
care, external review of clinical decisions for the purpose of
controlling health costs and limitations on the length of hospi-
tal stays.100 On the other hand, Canadian physicians were
much more likely to complain of limitations on the supply of
well-equipped medical facilities.'
ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE MEDICAL
PROFESSION AND THE STATE
These observations point to a central feature of Canadian
Medicare: its birth may owe much to social democracy, but its
ongoing maintenance and development depends upon an ac-
commodation between the medical profession and the state. It
is useful here to distinguish, as Patricia Day and Rudolph
Klein'012 have done in the British case, between the "constitu-
tional" politics that surrounded the establishment of Canadian
Medicare, and the ongoing distributional politics that have
flowed in its wake. The establishment of the system had more
to do with partisan and federal-provincial politics than with the
relationship between the medical profession and the state. The
social democratic NDP government of Saskatchewan pioneered
both hospital and medical insurance, and it has been argued
that it was the growing popularity of the NDP at the federal
level that prompted the governing federal Liberals to introduce
a wave of welfare-state legislation, including the Medical Care
Act, in the minority parliament of 1964-68.1°3 Furthermore,
the medical profession did not enter the Medicare era without
protest: medical strikes accompanied the introduction of uni-
versal medical care insurance in both Saskatchewan and Que-
bec.104 But the terms of the "constitutional" understandings
reached by the profession and the state surrounding the intro-
duction of Medicare ensured that the medical profession would
100. Id. at 1015.
101. Id.
102. Patricia Day & Rudolph Klein, Constitutional and Distributional Conflict on
British Medical Politics: The Case of General Practice, 1911-91, 11 POLITICAL STUDIES
462, 462 (1992).
103. See, e.g., INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE, supra note 15, at 142-43.
104. See id. at 117
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play a central policy-making role. The Medicare era itself has
been marked by an accommodation between the profession and
the state.
The particular nature of that accommodation varies across
provinces, for it is at the provincial level that health care policy
has been made, within broad federal guidelines. In some prov-
inces, notably British Columbia and Manitoba, the profession-
state relationship has been adversarial; in Quebec it has been
more "statist"; and in other provinces it has been more collabo-
rative, albeit marked by episodes of conflict.1 °5 But each of
these accommodations has revolved around two pivotal trade-
offs for the medical profession: one between the entrepreneurial
and the clinical discretion of physicians; the other between
their individual and their collective autonomy.
The first of these trade-offs arises from the principles em-
bodied in the Canadian health insurance system: the removal of
financial barriers to access medically necessary services. The
removal of financial barriers at the point of contact with the
system implies that the state assumes the costs of medical and
hospital services. The state thus acquires a direct interest in
those costs, an interest that brings it into conflict with the
traditional entrepreneurial discretion of the physician to set the
price, as well as to determine the volume and mix of the ser-
vices that he or she provides.
Almost all of the conflict between the medical profession
and the state that followed in the wake of the adoption of
Medicare concerned the price of medical services. Under Medi-
care, as the federal government progressively withdrew from
cost-sharing agreements, provincial governments became the
primary bearers of the costs of medical and hospital services. In
seeking to control these costs, provincial governments turned
first to prices: fees for medical services and charges for hospital
patient days. Rather than paying the medical fees that were
"usual and customary" in particular localities as did U.S.
third-party payers, provincial governments at first agreed to
pay physicians on the basis of the fee schedules set by the pro-
105. JONATHON LOMAS. CATHY CHARLES & JANET GREB. THE PRICE OF PEACE: THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF PHYSICIAN FEE NEGOTIATIONS IN CANADA 168-69 (McMas-
ter University Centre for Health Economic and Policy Analysis Working Paper #92-17,
1992). For an analysis of the fee negotiation in each province, territory and generally, see
id. generally.
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vincial medical associations, 108 prorated by a given percentage.
Soon, however, the schedule of payments was set through nego-
tiations between the government and the medical association in
each province. In most cases they negotiated overall increases
in the payment schedule, leaving the allocation of these in-
creases across individual items in the fee schedule to be carried
out internally by the medical associations themselves. 10 7 In
making these internal allocations, medical associations have
typically been more concerned with smoothing income differen-
tials across specialty groups than with measuring the relative
costs or benefits of given procedures. 0 8 In reaching their ac-
commodations with the state, that is, medical associations have
had to manage delicate internal accommodations, a point to
which I shall shortly return.
Over time, the agenda of these negotiations has broadened
to include the establishment of more-or-less firmly fixed caps
on total expenditures on physicians' services under the govern-
ment plans.0 9 The rationale for the establishment of these lim-
its was to take account of utilization increases." 0 In fact, how-
ever, a comprehensive survey of the negotiation process in all
ten provinces concluded that the purpose of government was to
establish global limits: arguments about increased "utilization"
simply provided a politically feasible way of doing so."'
As a result of these negotiations, then, the entrepreneurial
discretion of individual physicians has been limited. Prices are
established centrally, and the economic pay-off from varying
volume and mix may bump up against either individual or
global caps. One effect of Medicare, then, has been to increase
substantially the role of organized medicine. This brings us to
the second, and indeed more basic trade-off with which physi-
cians are faced under Canadian Medicare. In order to retain
some power over the price of their services, individual physi-
cians have had to cede their ability to set prices to the central
association. This process was not without conflict; and each
106. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 36.
107. See LOMAS. CHARLES. & GREB, supra note 105, at 184-85.
108. Id.
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provincial association has had to manage a complex and deli-
cate internal accommodation.
For a time, there was an option for physicians to escape
these constraints to some extent by "extra-billing" their pa-
tients, that is, by billing patients over and above what the gov-
ernment plan would pay. Only about ten percent of physicians
exercised this option, and the amount of extra-billing was esti-
mated at only about 1.3% of total physician billings under
Medicare." 2 In no province did this amount exceed three per-
cent.'13 The economic and political significance of extra-billing
was increased, however, by the fact that it was "clustered" in
certain specialties and localities." 4 Even more important in po-
litical terms, extra-billing flew in the face of one of the funda-
mental principles underlying Canadian Medicare - the re-
moval of financial barriers to access medical and hospital care.
In the early 1980s, a federal Liberal government declining
in popularity and facing non-Liberal governments in each of
the provinces, seized upon the issue of extra-billing as a way of
symbolizing its commitment to preserving the universality of
the nation's most popular social program. It portrayed non-Lib-
eral governments in the provinces as allowing the principle of
universality to be eroded by condoning extra-billing, and passed
legislation, the Canada Health Act of 1984,115 penalizing those
provinces by providing for federal transfer payments to be re-
duced by an amount equal to the estimated amount of extra-
billing in any given province: a dollar-for-dollar penalty." 6
In one sense, at least, the federal strategy back-fired. The
federal Conservatives, whom the Liberals had hoped to tar with
the same brush as their siblings in power in several provinces,
supported the Canada Health Act in Parliament. 117 With its
passage in 1984, the politics shifted to the provinces and were
shaped by the relationship between the medical profession and
the government in each province. In all cases but one, the pro-
cess of negotiating the ban on extra-billing was relatively non-
112. TUOHY, supra note 32, at 116-117.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. R.S.C., ch. C-6 (1984) (Can.).
116. R.S.C. ch. C-6, §§ 18, 20.
117. See TUOHY, supra note 32, at 129; Peter Ward, Medical Care Laws Are Likely
to Change, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1983, available in LEXIS, Papers Database.
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conflictual, and the medical profession achieved substantial
gains in the form of fee schedule increases and binding arbitra-
tion mechanisms for future fee schedule disputes.
The exception was Ontario, where the banning of extra-
billing occasioned unprecedented conflict between the Ontario
Medical Association ("OMA") and the government, culminat-
ing in a four-week doctors' strike."I This conflict was largely
the result of the disruption of the accommodation between the
OMA and the provincial government resulting from the acces-
sion of the Liberals to power after forty-three years of Con-
servative rule. The episode poisoned the relationship between
the OMA and the government for a time, but in 1991 a wide-
ranging agreement between the OMA and the social demo-
cratic NDP government, which had by then replaced the Liber-
als, inaugurated a new era of profession-state
accommodation.' 19
Throughout this process, the clinical discretion of individ-
ual physicians - the ability of the individual physician to exer-
cise his or her clinical judgement in individual cases according
to professionally determined standards - has remained virtu-
ally untouched. Financial constraints have been global and
across-the-board; within those constraints, physicians experi-
ence relatively little second-guessing by third parties. Utiliza-
tion review committees established in several provinces to mon-
itor physicians' practice patterns have focused on only the most
aberrant cases, identified by volume of billings.
It can legitimately be argued that the clinical autonomy of
physicians is constrained to the extent that the diagnostic and
therapeutic options open to them are limited by available facili-
ties and equipment. It must be remembered, however, that the
facilities subject to the greatest constraint in Canada, are those
involving certain high-technology procedures; 120 and there is
considerable debate among clinical epidemiologists as to the
range of conditions for which such procedures are in fact indi-
cated. As for other resources such as hospital beds and nursing
staff, Canada has fewer hospital beds per capita, but more em-
ployees per bed than the OECD average. (In the U.S., the
118. Ingelhart, supra note 55, at 565; TUOHY, supra note 29, at 122-23.
119. TUOHY, supra note 32, at 131.
120. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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bed:population ratio is even lower, while the employee:bed ratio
is higher.) In the three-nation survey of physicians cited above,
Canadians were not significantly more likely than Americans to
complain of a shortage of competent nursing staff.121
The point remains that within gross over-all constraints,
the clinical autonomy of the individual physician, and of the
profession as a whole, has been maintained. As the agenda of
health policy evolves in Canada, the various accommodations
between the medical profession and provincial government that
underlie the preservation of clinical autonomy will be tested. So
far, these accommodations have proved remarkably resilient.
This can be seen by considering the course of development of
several major items on the health care agenda of the 1990s:




The issue of "user fees" for insured services was put to
rest for a time with the passage of the Canada Health Act and
the compliance of all provinces with that federal legislation.
The issue of user fees has re-emerged, however.122 The Canada
Health Act, which bans such charges, has become increasingly
toothless. In its efforts to reduce spending, the federal govern-
ment is progressively withdrawing from sharing the cost of pro-
vincial health insurance plans. With the end of federal contri-
butions in some provinces toward the end of this decade,1 23 the
federal government's ability to enforce the provisions of the Ca-
nada Health Act will come to an end as well, unless funding is
restored or some other enforcement mechanism is introduced.
Without the discipline of the federal legislation, it is possi-
ble that some provincial governments will re-introduce user
fees. Any government that sought to re-introduce extra-billing
121. See Blendon et al., supra note 86, at 1015.
122. The federal government in 1994 reduced its transfer to the British Columbia
government as a penalty for allowing extra-billing by a local group of physicians. It has
also established a deadline for provinces to cease allowing private clinics to charge "facility
fees" in addition to the amount covered by governmental insurance.
123. Kenneth Norrie, Social Policy and Equalization, in THE FUTURE OF FISCAL
FEDERALISM 163 (Keith G. Banting et al. eds., 1994).
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would do so at a great political risk, however, for little political
or fiscal gain.
b) De-Insuring
So far, provincial governments appear to be more at-
tracted to the option of de-insuring some services than to the
imposition of user fees as a cost control measure. This response
is, indeed, more consistent with Canada's "segmented" rather
than "tiered" approach to the role of the public and private
sectors. The Canada Health Act made even more explicit the
premises of its predecessor legislation: on its face, it requires
provincial health insurance plans to cover fully all "medically
required" physician services and a broadly defined set of "nec-
essary" types of hospital services in order to qualify for federal
financial contributions.124 Provincial governments, in complying
with the federal legislation, have either de facto or de jure ac-
cepted "medical necessity" as the standard for coverage under
their respective plans. The determination of which physicians
services are "medically required" and which hospital services
are "necessary," however, has not been defined in legislation.
In the hospital sector, the operational definition of "neces-
sity" has been negotiated by government and health care prov-
iders. Through a process of prospective global hospital budget-
ing, provincial governments have, since the 1970s, been
negotiating with individual hospitals about how many beds,
imaging machines, etc. are "necessary." Differences of opinion
in this regard resulted for a time in hospitals breaching their
budgets to adopt non-approved programs.' 25 The resulting defi-
cits were tolerated and forgiven for a time by governments, but
the limits of that tolerance were reached in the late 1980s."2 '
The question of what physicians' services are "medically
required" has, until recently, not been a matter of negotiation
between providers and governments. As noted earlier, fee
schedule negotiations between medical associations and provin-
cial governments have generally focused on the overall percent-
age increase in fees, not the relative value of items nor the
scope of the services covered, which has changed little since a
124. R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 2.
125. See TOUHY, supra note 32, at 120.
126. See id.
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broad base of coverage was established in each province upon
the establishment of Medicare.127
There have been, however, recent attempts to de-limit the
scope of coverage under Medicare. Under the letter and the
spirit of both federal provincial legislation, services can be de-
insured only if they are deemed not to be medically necessary.
Negotiations to identify potential candidates for de-insuring
have been undertaken between the medical profession and gov-
ernment in a number of provinces. To date, there has been very
little effect on the comprehensiveness of coverage, but the dis-
cussions around these issues are worth briefly considering here
for what they can tell us about the shape of future
developments.
Most of the services and procedures considered for "de-
insuring" are related to cosmetic surgery, mental health and
reproduction. The selection of these procedures for considera-
tion has resulted in part from the ideological agendas of gov-
ernments, and in part from a consideration of income differen-
tials within the medical profession. In Alberta in 1985, as part
of the negotiations between the Alberta Medical Association
and the provincial government pertaining to the banning of ex-
tra-billing, it was decided that several services be "de-insured,"
including family planning counseling, tubal ligations, vasecto-
mies and mammoplasty. This selection was driven largely by
the conservation social policy ideology of the governing Con-
servative Party of the day. From the perspective of the medical
profession, however, it focused with few exceptions on fairly lu-
crative procedures performed by relatively high-earning spe-
cialists. Furthermore, the de-insurance of such services freed
physicians to bill privately at rates of their own choosing. As an
internal accommodation within the profession, it allowed for
some smoothing of differentials in Medicare earnings while al-
lowing a "safety valve" for the specialties affected. This agree-
ment did not survive the public protest that ensued, however,
and funding for most of these services was restored.
In Ontario, a number of services has also been proposed
for de-insuring. In this case, the list includes some cosmetic
procedures and in vitro fertilization ("IVF") in some circum-
127. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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stances. 12 8 (Ontario is the only province in which IVF is a pub-
licly insured service.) Again, these are lucrative services and
procedures are performed by relatively high-earning specialists.
Their de-insurance would allow them to be offered in private
markets. The OMA, however, was initially less disposed to
enter into this type of accommodation than its Alberta counter-
part had been. The response in Ontario was essentially a proce-
dural one; the provincial government and the OMA came to an
agreement on the structures through which decisions would be
made about the efficacy of various procedures through health
services research and determined that decisions about insur-
ance coverage would be made on that basis.
As part of the wide-ranging 1991 agreement between the
Ontario government and the OMA noted above, a Joint Man-
agement Committee ("JMC") was formed between the Ontario
government and the OMA, and under its aegis an Institute for
Clinical Evaluation Sciences was established, based at a To-
ronto teaching hospital. The process of developing a list of pro-
cedures to be de-insured went on for over a year until it be-
came entailed in the government's broad expenditure control
agenda in the Spring of 1993. The unfolding of that episode
casts further light on the evolving nature of the profession-state
accommodation, and merits some elaboration here.
As part of a broad expenditure control package in June
1993, the NDP government of Ontario introduced legislation
giving it broad powers to de-insure services, and to limit pay-
ments under the government health insurance plan on the basis
of the utilization profile of the patient, the practitioner or the
facility involved. 12 9 The OMA reacted strongly and vocifer-
ously against these provisions, accusing the government of pre-
empting the JMC process, and mounting an extensive public
relations campaign. The government, for its part, stated that
the legislation provision constituted a "fail safe" to take effect
only if a negotiated agreement with the OMA could not be
128. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, Costs Drive Canada to Limit Free Health Care, OR-
EGONIAN, March 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, Papers Database.
129. That is, payment for a given service could be reduced or denied if the number
of services provided to a given patient, or by a given physician, or within a given facility
exceeded a prescribed maximum during a particular time period. The legislation also
granted the government broad regulatory powers to control expenditures, limit the number
of practitioners and affect the geographic distribution of practitioners and facilities.
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reached. In the result, the OMA and the government reached
an agreement on a range of cost-control measures, including a
three-year freeze on medical fees and a "hard cap" on total
physicians' billings. The JMC process for the determination of
which services were to be de-insured was reinstated, tied to
tighter deadlines, given a set dollar volume ($420 million) by
which billings were to be reduced through de-insurance, and
augmented by an advisory panel including "members of the
public" as well as medical and governmental representatives
and tied to tighter deadlines.
There are at least three points worth noting about these
developments in Ontario for what they suggest about the evolu-
tion of the profession-state accommodation. First, they suggest
that governments may be more willing to flex their legislative
muscle to establish a "shadow" within which their negotiations
with the profession can proceed. Second, they suggest the resili-
ency of the profession-state accommodation even under condi-
tions of growing fiscal constraint. And third, they suggest that
the government's approach to accommodation may be shifting
the balance of power within the medical profession over time.
In the past, academically-based physicians were at the core of
profession-state accommodation; and the OMA played a vary-
ing role depending upon the vagaries of its internal politics.130
The NDP government of Ontario has preferred, however, to
deal primarily with the OMA as the legitimate "bargaining
agent" for the profession. 13 1 For its part, the OMA has worked
its way through a wrenching internal process which has left it
more open to accommodation with the state. Now for the first
time a body central to the profession-state relationship, the
JMC, has no academically-based medical members.
This new accommodation between the OMA and the pro-
vincial government in Ontario has not been without controversy
within the profession. There is still a minority body of opinion
which holds that the OMA has been too concerned with the
preservation and enhancement of the power of organized
medicine at the expense of the autonomy of the individual phy-
sician. The 1991 agreement, which not only established the
JMC but also provided for an automatic check-off of member-
130. See TUOHY, supra note 32, at 126.
131. Id. at 151.
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ship dues to the OMA from each individual physician's pay-
ments under Medicare, was strongly contested by this minority.
The agreement was finally ratified at a highly publicized mass
meeting of the OMA membership in a Toronto hockey arena.
c) Clinical Guidelines
The tension between the collective autonomy of the profes-
sion and the individual autonomy of the practitioner is raised
even more squarely by the development of clinical guidelines.
The issue of using clinical guidelines developed by professional
bodies to shape the behavior of individual practitioners has
been on the agenda of Canadian health policy, to very little
effect, for well over a decade. In the early 1990s, however, this
mechanism has achieved greater prominence. A number of
provinces have developed joint profession-government bodies to
develop clinical guidelines, although the fiscal sanctions associ-
ated with the guidelines vary considerably. Ontario's Institute
for Clinical Evaluative Sciences, under the aegis of the JMC, is
one such mechanism, and the status of the guidelines it is to
develop is as yet unclear. An earlier initiative in Ontario in
which guidelines on the use of Caesarean sections were widely
distributed to obstetricians was unsuccessful in modifying prac-
ticioner behavior. In Saskatchewan, however, guidelines on thy-
roid tests issued by the Health Services Utilization and Re-
search Commission resulted in a marked drop (sixty-five to
seventy-nine percent) in the ordering of certain tests in circum-
stances in which the guidelines suggested they were not indi-
cated." 2 In British Columbia, an undertaking to develop
clinical guidelines backed by legislation and fiscal sanctions
formed the centerpiece of an agreement negotiated between the
British Columbia Medical Association and the BC government
in August 1993. As governments and professional bodies thus
move slowly in the direction of "managed care," relations be-
tween the profession and the state, and between individual
practitioners and professional bodies, will be under increasing
pressure.
132. Rod Mickleburgh, $1-Million to be Saved by Cuts in Thyroid Tests, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Aug. 31, 1993, at AI-2.
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d) Organizational Change
The relationships between governments and professional
bodies will also be strained as the health care system increas-
ingly confronts issues of organizational change. These issues
have been on the agenda of Canadian health policy since the
1970s, but outside Quebec there has been very little action in
this regard. Now these issues are rising on the agenda in a
number of provinces, although the response has varies depend-
ing on a mix of factors including the partisan complexion of the
government and the degree of populism or statism in the politi-
cal culture. Under NDP governments, for example, both Brit-
ish Columbia and Saskatchewan have recently announced plans
to decentralize policy-making structures by establishing sys-
tems of local (and, in British Columbia, regional) health au-
thorities with greater budgetary and managerial powers than
have been granted to similar bodies in the past. In less populist
Ontario, the NDP government has made a number of decisions
centrally, such as the decision to regularize the practice of mid-
wifery, that have important implications for the re-organization
of health care delivery, and has not expanded the powers of
district health councils beyond their traditional advisory func-
tions. Quebec and New Brunswick, under Liberal governments,
have established or re-organized regional boards with some-
what more limited scope and more constrained powers than
those proposed in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Organi-
zational reforms in Nova Scotia, begun under a Conservative
government and continued under a Liberal government, estab-
lished a system of regional planning agencies with advisory
powers only. In Manitoba, under a Conservative government,
proposals for a re-structuring of the delivery system have ema-
nated from the provincial government without the creation of
local or regional councils.1 3
There is, then, at least in theory, considerable scope for
variation across provincial plans: the definition of "medical ne-
cessity" and the structure of the health care delivery system
have been determined in the context of an accommodation be-
133. JEREMIAH HURLEY. JONATHAN LOMAS & VANDNA BHATIA, IS THE WOLF FI-
NALLY AT THE DOOR? PROVINCIAL REFORM TO MANAGE HEALTH-CARE RESOURCES (MC-
Master University Center for Health Economics and Policy Analysis Working Paper 93-
12, 1993).
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tween the medical profession and the state in each province.
And it is true that costs, supply and utilization vary considera-
bly across provinces.13 4 What is remarkable is that the varia-
tion is not greater than it is, given the loose constraints of the
federal legislation. This variation is limited because the inter-
ests of the medical profession are fundamentally similar across
provinces; and, if clinical discretion is to be maintained while
entrepreneurial discretion is limited, these interests militate in
favor of a comprehensive and generously funded scheme. For
the same reason, the progressive withdrawal of the federal gov-
ernment, which is likely to continue over the rest of this dec-
ade, will not lead to substantially greater variation across
provinces.
In summary, the Canadian health insurance system has
removed financial barriers to the access of a comprehensive
range of services, while leaving the definition of that range es-
sentially to the medical profession. These defining principles of
the system imply a distribution of power and its flip side, au-
tonomy. It places physicians in a position of power/autonomy
to determine the range of services provided while limiting their
economic power and autonomy.
The "social democratic" character of Canadian Medicare
is not simply a function of its founding principles. Rather, it is
a function of the expression of those principles in power struc-
tures. Let me further develop this point by drawing two con-
trasts: one, international, between the Canadian and British
health systems, and the other, intra-national, between the Ca-
nadian health care system and the Canadian public pension
system.
HEALTH CARE IN BRITAIN AND CANADA
First, let us contrast the Canadian and British health care
systems. In Britain, governmental health costs amount to about
5.5 % of the GDP, and about over eighty percent of total health
care costs. 13 5 Most accounts of the British system, before the
1990 reforms, suggest that physicians retained considerable
clinical discretion within broad budgetary constraints, although
the balance between individual and collective autonomy might
134. TUOHY, supra note 32, at 137.
135. TounY, supra note 29, at 285 & n.7.
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have been tilting more toward the collective end of the scale
over time. A study of medical decision-making under conditions
of "rationing" in Britain made this point."3 6 They observed that
although governmental budgetary decisions regarding equip-
ment and staffing established overall budgetary constraints,
there was virtually no regulatory control over the diagnostic
and therapeutic decisions of individual physicians.3 In cases in
which those decisions resulted in "excessive" expenditures, "ac-
tions were taken by senior [medical] staff which led to volun-
tary curbs by the physicians responsible."' 38 Arnold Heiden-
heimer, in contrasting the British and German systems, argued
that British physicians have even more clinical autonomy than
do German physicians, precisely because the British National
Health Service, with its greater control of broad budgetary pa-
rameters, can tolerate greater freedom within individual
practices."' 3 9
The 1990 reforms do not substantially change this charac-
terization. As in the Canadian case, however, public policy
changes may bring about shifts in the balance of power within
the medical profession. In Britain, the establishment of fund-
holding general practices ("g.p.") may change that balance by
subjecting consultants to closer questioning by g.p.'s. (Interest-
ingly, the funding-holding reforms have reintroduced a dimen-
sion of entrepreneurialism to general practice, a feature which
explains much of its appeal to the "first wave" of g.p. fund-
holders.) But a potential shift in the balance of power between
g.p.'s and consultants does not threaten the clinical discretion
of physicians per se. Furthermore, there is some evidence that
referral patterns have not changed as a result of these re-
forms. 140 Nor have District Health Authorities so far proved to
be a threat to professional autonomy rather, they have shown
themselves, if anything, to be more cautious about disputing
136. William B. Schwartz & Henry J. Aaron, Rationing Hospital Care: Lessons
from Britain, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 52 (1984).
137. Id. at 54 (mentioning the only possible control as the intervention of other staff
physicians).
138. Id.
139. ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER ET AL. COMPARATIVE PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS
OF SOCIAL CHOICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 61 (2d ed. 1983).
140. Angela Coulter & Jean Bradlow, Effects of NHS Reforms on General Practi-
tioner's Referral Patterns, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 433-37 (1993).
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the professional judgements of providers in the hospital sector
than are g.p.'s.141
The budgetary constraints within which physicians must
operate in Britain, however, are considerably more stringent
than those which exist in Canada, as is apparent in the lower
overall levels of governmental spending on health care in Brit-
ain.' In the fact of these constraints, and in contrast to the
Canadian case, a private market in medical and hospital ser-
vices has been maintained as a kind of "safety valve."
In order to understand the differences between the Cana-
dian and British systems, we need to go back to the genesis of
the programs, to the prevailing policy ideas and power struc-
tures of the time. The NHS was born in the era of Beveridge
reforms, in a context in which the medical profession was orga-
nizationally divided between general practitioners and special-
ists who held different views about the appropriate direction of
public policy. In such a context, the trade-off between eco-
nomic and clinical discretion was made on terms more unfavor-
able to the profession than was later to be the case in Canada.
National health insurance was first considered in Canada
at the time the NHS was being born in Britain. In 1945-46, the
federal government presented a set of proposals for a cost-
shared national health insurance problem to the provinces, pro-
posals that had been shaped in part by the observation of con-
temporary developments in Britain.'4" At the time, there ex-
isted a remarkable consensus among medical, hospital and
insurance interests favorable to the establishment of a compre-
hensive health insurance plan in the public sector.' 4 ' Viewing
such a plan as "necessary ... and probably inevitable,'145
these groups supported it in principle and sought to maximize
their influence over its development and implementation. The
sense of inevitability arose in no small part from their observa-
tion of events in Britain. Had national health insurance been
adopted at that time, it would undoubtedly have borne a closer
resemblance to the NHS than did the scheme that ultimately
141. Howard Glennerster & Manos Matsaganis, The U.K. Health Reforms: The
Fundholding Experiment, 23 HEALTH POLICY 179, 189 (1993).
142. See supra notes 33, 135 and accompanying text.
143. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 32-33.
144. Id. at 33.
145. INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE, supra note 15, at 49.
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resulted. 4" As it was, however, the federal proposals went
down to defeat, tied as they were to a broader package of pro-
posals for federal-provincial fiscal arrangements that were un-
acceptable to the provinces.147
The resulting delay gave time for private plans to develop
and expand, and for various provincial governments to experi-
ment with different models of governmental health insurance
plans. By the late 1950s and 1960s, when a federal-provincial
climate more favorable to the launching of a national plan had
developed, a substantial proportion of the population had be-
come accustomed to relatively generous and comprehensive
coverage under private insurance plans. 48 Furthermore, opin-
ion within the medical profession had come to favor govern-
mental subsidization and supplementation of private plans. 49
Although its view ultimately did not prevail, the medical pro-
fession presented a relatively united front, and could establish a
policy price for its participation in the program. The system
was hence launched on an economic and political base
favorable to more generous financing and a greater degree of
medical influence than had been the case in Britain.
HEALTH CARE VS. PUBLIC PENSIONS IN CANADA
If Canadian Medicare has a social democratic character,
the Canadian public pension system clearly does not. As the
system developed over time, means-tested pensions introduced
at the federal level in the 1920s were replaced by a three-tiered
system of universal, contributory and income-tested supplemen-
tal benefits. 50 The universal tier, the Old Age Security
("OAS") pension, was introduced in 1951.' 11 It provides a flat-
rate benefit and is financed from general revenues.15 2 The OAS
146. See INSURING NAT'L HEALTH CARE, supra note 15, at 33 (discussing the his-
torical background and development of the Canadian Medicare system); TUOHY, supra
note 32 at 144-45.
147. Canadian Health, supra note 15, at 33.
148. Id. at 33-34.
149. Id. at 34.
150. See Paul D. Pierson & R. Kent Weaver, Imposing Losses in Pension Policy, in
Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER? GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ABROAD 110, 124-25 (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1993). JOHN MYLES.
OLD AGE IN THE WELFARE STATE 38, 46-47 (rev. ed. 1989); KEITH BANTING, THE WEL-
FARE STATE AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM 7-11 (1982).
151. See MYLES, supra note 150, at 77-78.
152. See BANTING, supra note 150, at 7.
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plan is not designed, however, to provide sufficient income for a
pensioner. The pension scheme also includes a contributory
tier, the Canada Pension Plan ("CPP"), introduced in 1965.153
CPP benefits are related to contributions and both are related
to earnings, up to a maximum. Finally, for those with income
below a certain level, there is a Guaranteed Income Supple-
ment ("GIS"), introduced in 1966, as well as other supplemen-
tary provincial plans. 5
With its limited universal benefit, supplemented either by
the means-tested GIS or the contributory CPP or both, this is a
"quasi-Beveridge" system. As of the early 1980s, it performed
relatively well, in international perspective, in raising the low-
income elderly out of poverty.1 5 5 But it performed relatively
poorly in replacing the income of the average worker upon re-
tirement,156 and even more poorly in the case of upper-income
earners. Hence, it encouraged both middle- and upper-income
individuals to turn to private alternatives. It must be noted that
as the contributory CPP matures, replacement rates are
rising. 157
As in other industrialized states, the Canadian public pen-
sion system underwent some reform in the 1980s. After an
abortive attempt in 1985 to reduce OAS benefits by partially
removing inflation protection, the federal Conservative govern-
ment in 1989 introduced a "claw back" of the OAS pension
from higher-income earners. 58 Accordingly, the OAS pension
is now progressively taxed back at higher levels of income, and
is taxed back completely for the upper five percent of income
earners. 159 This "universal" tier was thus effectively converted
to an income-tested plan. These changes, together with an en-
hancement of the GIS in the early 1980s, enhanced further the
focus of the Canadian public pension scheme upon low-income
153. Id. at 9.
154. Id. at 13; Pierson & Weaver, supra note 150, at 124-25.
155. See Timothy Smeeding et al., Patterns of Income and Poverty: The Economic
Status of Children and the Elderly in Eight Countries, in THE VULNERABLE 89, 111 (John
L. Palmer et al. eds., 1988).
156. See Jonathan Aldrich, The Earnings Replacement Rate of Old-Age Benefits in
12 Countries, 45 SoC. SECURITY BULL 3, 8 (1982); MYLES, supra note 150, at 56.
157. See Keith G. Banting, Economic Integration and Social Policy: Canada and
the United States, in SOCIAL POLICY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 29-30 (Terrance M. Hun-
sley ed., 1992).
158. See id. at 30.
159. See id. at 29.
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individuals.1 6 The contributory CPP underwent less structural
change, although modest reforms in 1986 resulted in greater
flexibility in the retirement age, improvement in the rights of
surviving spouses, enhancement of disability benefits and an in-
crease in the contribution rate.
The Canadian public pension system was put into place in
the 1950s and 1960s, roughly the same period in which the
medical and hospital insurance system was taking shape. Why
did the Canadian political system, at the same period in its his-
tory, yield a social-democratic health insurance system, and a
Beveridge-style pension system? And why, in the 1980s, did fis-
cal pressures lead to an erosion of universality in the pension
system and not in the health care system? The answer lies in
the structure of interests in these two arenas. There is, in the
pension arena, no group comparable to the medical profession.
The pension system involves a transfer of incomes, not services.
There is no other group of service providers whose income and
careers are as tied up with the generosity of the system. In both
arenas, the consumer interest is diffuse. 1' And although the
"consumers" of pensions lobbied effectively against an across-
the-board reduction of the basic pension in 1985, claw-backs
from upper-income pension recipients occasioned much less
consumer protest. 62
In the absence of a strong "provider" interest, public pen-
sion policy is shaped almost entirely by the interests of govern-
ments. Banting has pointed out the extent to which income
maintenance policies in Canada are shaped by the interests of
"governments as governments," essentially, jurisdictional and
fiscal concerns.'6 3 This means, in the first place that, since
change in a number of key income maintenance programs en-
tails a complex set of implications for the fiscal responsibilities
160. See id. at 30.
161. Organized labor, which has been an effective proponent of generous social pro-
grams in other nations, is too organizationally decentralized and ideologically divided to
play a similar role in Canada. See David Cameron, Social Democracy, Corporatism, La-
bour Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist So-
ciety, in ORDER AND CONFLICT IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (John Goldthorpe ed.,
1984); Rodney Haddow, The Canadian Labour Congress and the Welfare State Debates,
paper presented at the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Associa-
tion, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, June 4, 1991.
162. Banting, supra note 157, at 29-30.
163. See KEITH BANTING, THE WELFARE STATE AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM 43, 51
(2d ed. 1987).
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of various levels of government, governmental interests have ac-
cordingly acted as a brake on policy development. Hence, there
were few changes to the Canada Pension Plan, which involves a
complex set of federal-provincial arrangements, in the 1980s.
Second, governments frustrated by federal-provincial entangle-
ments tend to turn to those instruments over which they have
exclusive control. This explains, the focus on Old Age Security
pensions by the federal Conservatives in the same period."6 4 In
addition, the interest of "governments as governments" comes
into play: the way in which governments use the instruments at
their command will be determined not so much by group pres-
sure as by partisanship and ideology. This will cause the ero-
sion of the universality of the OAS pension as part of the Con-
servative agenda of deficit reduction.
CONCLUSION
Medicare is Canada's social policy success story. Its social
democratic character has been attributed by a number of ob-
servers to the presence of a social democratic party within the
Canadian political system. The significance of the NDP in this
respect should not be slighted. After all, it was the NDP gov-
ernment of Saskatchewan that first introduced governmental
hospital insurance in 1944 and government medical insurance
in 1962, and it was arguably the electoral threat from the NDP
that led the minority federal Liberal government to press ahead
with the introduction of national medical care insurance in
1966. In the same era, however, the Canadian system gener-
ated a public pension system which, with its limited universal
and contributory benefit tiers, and its means-tested supplemen-
tal tier, is a hybrid of Beveridge and residualist welfare-state
models. In the 1980s, the universality of the health care system
was preserved, and indeed enhanced, while the limited univer-
sality of the pension system was eroded. The evolution of the
health insurance system, then, cannot be understood with refer-
ence to social democratic principles alone. It has depended as
well on the presence of a medical profession willing to enter
into an accommodation with the state, an accommodation
164. TUOHY, supra note 29, at 294-95; Paul D. Pierson & R. Kent Weaver, Impos-
ing Losses in Pension Policy, in Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER? GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES
IN THE US. AND ABROAD 148 (R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds. 1993).
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which trades off economic power to preserve the clinical auton-
omy of the profession as a whole, and to a large degree of indi-
vidual physicians too.
Any set of principles of distributive justice implies a distri-
bution of power, and it is through that structure of power that
the principles will be implemented. The Canadian system
places physicians, as the interpreters of the "necessity" of care,
in a central role. Although the Canadian medical profession
has resisted change at a number of key junctures, it has accom-
modated those changes.
The Canadian system is not without its problems. It re-
mains the second most expensive system in the industrialized
world.' 65 Geographic maldistribution of facilities and services
remains a problem. The treatment of the elderly, particularly
as the population ages, presents an enormous set of challenges.
Both the medical profession and the state, as the central
shapers of the system, are part of these problems. But they are
also part of the solutions. Such strengths as the system has, and
they are considerable, can be attributed to both parties, and
both will continue to shape the system in the future.
165. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.

